Writing for the Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist first established the two classes of officers established under the Appointments Clause: principal officers and inferior officers. Rehnquist cited Buckley v. Valeo (1976) to explain that “principal officers are selected by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.” On the other hand, inferior officers are those who “Congress may allow to be appointed by the President alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary.” 

Rehnquist noted that the “line between ‘inferior’ and ‘principal’ officers is one that is far from clear,” but stated that the Court didn’t need to address that question to decide this case “because in out view [Morrison] clearly falls on the ‘inferior officer’ side of that line.” Rehnquist listed four reasons to support the Court’s conclusion. 

First, Morrison is subject to removal by a higher-ranking official in the Executive Branch. Rehnquist explained that while Morrison may not be “subordinate” to the Executive “insofar as she possess a degree of independent discretion ... the fact that she can be removed by the Attorney General indicates that she is to some degree ‘inferior’ in rank and authority.” 

Second, Morrison is only empowered to perform “certain, limited duties.” Rehnquist acknowledged that the Act grants an independent counsel the “full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice,” but he explained that this authority doesn’t include any power to create policy or perform any administrative duties outside of those necessary to operate the office. He noted that the Act also “specifically provides” that the independent counsel comply with the policies of the DOJ in policy matters. 

Third, Morrison’s office is “limited in jurisdiction.” Rehnquist pointed out that “the Act itself [is] restricted in applicability to certain federal officials suspected of certain serious federal crimes,” and “an independent counsel can only act within the scope of the jurisdiction that has been granted by the Special Division pursuant to a request by the Attorney General.”  

Lastly, Morrison’s office is “limited in tenure.” Rehnquist found that while there is no time limit on the appointment of a particular counsel, “the office of independent counsel is ‘temporary’ in the sense that an independent counsel is appointed essentially to accomplish a single task, and when that task is over the office is terminated.” He added that “[u]nlike other prosecutors, [Morrison] has no ongoing responsibilities that extend beyond the accomplishment of the mission that she was appointed for and authorized by the Special Division to undertake.” 

Rehnquist ultimately concluded that Morrison’s position as independent counsel was constitutional, finding that the factors he discussed “relating to the ‘ideas of tenure, duration . . . and duties’ of the independent counsel are sufficient to establish that [Morrison] is an ‘inferior’ officer in the constitutional sense.” 

In his solo dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia warned that the majority’s decision had dangerous implications for the “equilibrium of power” established by the Constitution. He wrote that “[f]requently an issue of this sort will come before the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep’s clothing ... But this wolf comes as a wolf.” 

Scalia began by arguing the vesting of executive power “in a President of the United States” under Article II “does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power.” Scalia explained that the independent counsel must be found unconstitutional if these two questions were answered affirmatively: “(1) Is the conduct of a criminal prosecution (and of an investigation to decide whether to prosecute) the exercise of purely executive power? (2) Does the statute deprive the President of the United States of exclusive control over the exercise of that power?”  

On the first question, Scalia explained that the Court conceded that the functions performed by the independent counsel were executive, but qualified that concession by arguing that the functions are related to law enforcement and have typically been undertaken by officials within the Executive branch. In response, he wrote that “[t]he qualifier adds nothing but atmosphere. In what other sense can one identify ‘the executive Power’ that is supposed to be vested in the President (unless it includes everything the Executive Branch is given to do) except by reference to what has always and everywhere—if conducted by government at all—been conducted never by the legislature, never by the courts, and always by the executive.” Scalia ultimately found that “investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.”  

Regarding the second question, Scalia asserted that depriving the President of exclusive control over the executive activity “is indeed the whole object of the statute.” Scalia dismissed the Court’s argument that the President retains some control over the independent counsel through his Attorney General, writing that the “concession is alone enough to invalidate the statute.” He added that he “[could not] refrain from pointing out that the Court greatly exaggerates the extent of ... Presidential control.” The Court had reasoned that the Attorney General’s power to remove the counsel for “good cause” was significant, but Scalia responded that "[t]his is somewhat like referring to shackles as an effective means of locomotion.” 

Scalia concluded this analysis by noting that while the Court seemed to “concede an affirmative answer to both,” it “seeks to avoid the inevitable conclusion that since the statute vests some purely executive power in a person who is not the President of the United States it is void.” 

Scalia then illustrated the “utter incompatibility” of the Court’s approach by applying it to two examples involving the powers of the other branches. First, regarding the Legislative Branch, Scalia posited that “if Congress passed a statute depriving itself of less than full and entire control over some insignificant area of legislation, we would inquire whether the matter was ‘so central to the functioning of the Legislative Branch’ as really to require complete control, or whether the statute gives Congress ‘sufficient control over the surrogate legislator to ensure that Congress is able to perform its constitutionally assigned duties’? Of course we would have none of that.”  

In a second example involving the Judicial Branch, Scalia wrote, “consider a statute giving to non-Article III judges just a tiny bit of purely judicial power in a relatively insignificant field, with substantial control, though not total control, in the courts ... Is there any doubt that we would not pause to inquire whether the matter was ‘so central to the functioning of the Judicial Branch’ as really to require complete control, or whether we retained ‘sufficient control over the matters to be decided that we are able to perform our constitutionally assigned duties’? We would say that our ‘constitutionally assigned duties’ include complete control over all exercises of the judicial power.” 

Scalia finished by asking, “[i]s it unthinkable that the President should have such exclusive power, even when alleged crimes by him or his close associates are at issue?” He responded to that proposition by pointing out that both the Legislative and Judicial branches have exclusive power over areas in which they have special interests (legislation and cases involving their power). However, he wrote, “[a] system of separate and coordinate powers necessarily involves an acceptance of exclusive power that can theoretically be abused ... While the separation of powers may prevent us from righting every wrong, it does so in order to ensure that we do not lose liberty.” 

Scalia ultimately found that the Ethics Act deprived the President of substantial control over the independent counsel, which has a substantial affect on the balance of powers. He concluded by writing that the Court’s decision “demonstrates both the wisdom of our former constitutional system, in which the degree of reduced control and political impairment were irrelevant, since all purely executive power had to be in the President; and the folly of the new system of standardless judicial allocation of powers we adopt today.”