Writing for the Court, Justice Robert Jackson first addressed how this case is distinguished from the issue the Court ruled on in United States v. Darby (1941). In Darby, the court upheld Congress’ ability to regulate the production of goods for commerce, but they didn’t go as far as to authorize Congress to regulate the production of goods not intended for commerce in any way but rather entirely for an individual’s private consumption.  

Jackson then established a standard of review, writing that “questions of the power of Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’ and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce.” Jackson explained that “[w]hether the subject of the regulation in question was ‘production,’ ‘consumption,’ or ‘marketing’ is, therefore, not material for purposes of deciding the question of federal power before us.”  

Under this broad standard of interpretation, Jackson found that even if an individual’s activity is local and not typically regarded as commerce, “it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’” 

Applying this to the case at hand, Jackson agreed with the government’s argument that an effective way for the government to sustain or increase demand is to limit the supply, which is what the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 aimed to do by restricting production, even to “the extent ... which one may forestall resort to the market by producing to meet his own needs.” Jackson found that while Filburn’s “contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial” it’s not “by itself ... enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.” He added that “home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce. The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon.” 

Jackson concluded, emphasizing that the Court’s precedent has well established “that the power to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices affecting such prices.” Since that function of Congress’ power was the aim of the Act passed by them, it was upheld as constitutional. Ultimately, he held that the “record leaves us in no doubt that Congress may properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices.”