Writing for the Court, Justice Hugo Black upheld the use of presentence reports by judges during the sentencing phase, even if the reports contain information not introduced in open court during the trial. Black argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the same level of evidentiary standards in sentencing procedures as it does in the determination of guilt. He emphasized that historically, sentencing decisions have been left to the discretion of the judge who can consider a broader array of information than is admissible during the guilt phase of the trial. He wrote, “both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.” Black held that this practice does not violate constitutional rights and can effectively aid in tailoring sentences to the individual circumstances of each offender.

While Black agreed that allowing judges the discretion to consider out of court information in sentencing creates the possibility that they abuse their power, he argued that this risk exists any time a judge is given the power to impose the death penalty. He protected the discretionary power of judges in sentencing, writing, “[t]he due process clause should not be treated as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial procedure. So to treat the due process clause would hinder if not preclude all courts-state and federal-from making progressive efforts to improve the administration of criminal justice.” Black concluded that the Due Process Clause does not invalidate a sentence because a judge utilized out of court information in the determination of that sentence.