Johnson v. Zerbst
Case Overview
CITATION
304 U.S. 458 (1938)
ARGUED ON
April 4, 1938
DECIDED ON
May 23, 1938
DECIDED BY
Legal Issue
Does the Sixth Amendment require that indigent defendants in federal criminal trials be provided counsel?
Holding
Yes, the Sixth Amendment requires that indigent defendants in federal criminal trials be provided counsel unless that right is competently and intelligently waived.
The United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, where Johnson was held after his conviction | Credit: Federal Bureau of Prisons
Background
On November 21, 1934, Johnson and Bridwell were arrested in Charleston, South Carolina for feloniously uttering, passing, and possessing counterfeit money. Unable to post bail, they were kept in jail until their trial. On January 21, 1935, they were indicted.
Johnson and Bridwell’s arraignment, trial, and sentencing took place on January 23, the same day they were notified of the indictment. While the defendants obtained counsel for their preliminary hearings two months earlier, they were unable to do so for their trial. At the arraignment, both pleaded not guilty and represented themselves. They were found guilty and sentenced to four and a half years in the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia.
Summary
6 - 3 decision for Johnson
Johnson
Zerbst
Stone
Roberts
Reed
Hughes
Brandeis
McReynolds
Butler
Justice Cardozo took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Black
Opinion of the Court
Writing for the Court, Justice Owen Roberts held that the Sixth Amendment requires that indigent defendants in federal criminal trials be provided counsel unless this right is competently and intelligently waived. He wrote, “[s]ince the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.”
Specific to the defendants in the case, Roberts disagreed with the assertion that they had waived their right to counsel, finding no compelling evidence that they had done so in the proceedings. He explained, “[w]hile an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.”
Roberts concluded by remanding the case to the District Court and wrote “[i]f-on remand-the District Court finds from all of the evidence that petitioner has sustained the burden of proof resting upon him and that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel, it will follow that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed to judgment and conviction of petitioner, and he will therefore be entitled to have his petition granted.”