Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger began by establishing the presumption that a challenged statute is valid, but explained that just because a statute “is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.” Burger noted that since 1932, 295 congressional vetoes have been inserted into 196 different statutes and wrote that “[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that Congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and independent agencies.” 

Burger addressed the Presentment Clauses, explaining that the records from the Constitutional Convention show that requiring all legislation to be presented to the President before becoming law was “uniformly accepted by the framers.” He stated that “[p]resentment to the President and the Presidential veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure that these requirements could not be circumvented.” Burger explained that the “limited and qualified” veto power “was based on the profound conviction of the framers that the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be most carefully circumscribed.” On this point, Burger concluded that it’s “beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both Houses and the President.” 

Burger then turned to the interdependent concept of bicameralism, which was born from the Great Compromise at the Constitutional Convention. Burger stated that bicameral nature of Congress was created to ease fears and balance the interests of large and small states, and noted that “the framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions.” He explained, “[t]he President’s participation in the legislative process was to protect the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws. The division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings. The President’s unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of two thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto thereby precluding final arbitrary action of one person.” Here, Burger concluded that Article I’s prescription for legislative action “represents the framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.” 

Moving to the constitutionality of §244(c)(2), Burger first established that not every action taken by a House of Congress is subject to Article I’s presentment and bicameralism requirements. Burger explained that to determine if an act is subject to those requirements, the Court must evaluate whether the action “contain[s] matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect.”  

Regarding the House’s action under §244(c)(2), Burger found that the nature of it “manifests its legislative character” and stated that “the House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the legislative branch.” Burger explained that Congress’ decision to deport Chadha involved a determination of policy that Congress can only implement through bicameral passage and presentment to the President. He added that Congress must abide by its own delegations of authority until it’s legislatively altered or revoked.  

Burger then took note of the fourth specific provisions of the Constitution that are “explicit and unambiguous” as to a single House of Congress’ authority to act alone. These include the House of Representatives’ power to initiate impeachments (Art. I, §2, cl. 6; (b)); the Senate’s power to conduct impeachment trials and convict following trial (Art. I, §3, cl. 5; (c)); the Senate’s power to approve or disapprove presidential appointments (Art. II, §2, cl. 2; (d)); the Senate’s power to ratify treaties negotiated by the President (Art. II, §2, cl. 2.). Burger explained that when the framers sought to grant special powers to one House independent of the other or of the President, “they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms.” He argued that these exceptions are “narrow, explicit, and separately justified” and that the “carefully defined exceptions from presentment and bicameralism underscore the difference between the legislative functions of Congress and other unilateral but important and binding one-House acts provided for in the Constitution.” 

Burger held that since §244(c)(2) wasn’t within any of the express constitutional exceptions that would allow the House of Representatives to act alone, it was subject to the Article I requirements of presentment and bicameralism. He emphasized that bicameralism and presentment were intended “to erect enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the people from improvident exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps.” He argued that “[t]o preserve those checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded. To accomplish what has been attempted by one House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution’s prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President.” 

Burger acknowledged that choices about the structure of our government made at the Constitutional Convention may “impose burdens” that “often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable.” However, he noted that “those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked.” He argued that nothing in the Constitution or the Court’s precedent supports the idea “that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with explicit Constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President,” and ultimately concluded that “[w]ith all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.”