Gregg v. Georgia

Case Overview

CITATION

ARGUED ON

DECIDED ON

DECIDED BY

428 U.S. 153

Mar. 30-31, 1976

Jul. 2, 1976

Legal Issues

Is the death penalty inherently unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause?

Holding

No, the imposition of the death penalty does not automatically unconstitutional if its application is not wanton or arbitrary and is subject to meaningful review and considers the characteristics of the offender and crime.

Troy Leon Gregg, the named defendant in the Georgia capital prosecution before the court | Credit: Georgia State University

Background

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia (1972), several states, including Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and Louisiana, amended their death penalty statutes to meet comply with the new guidelines guidelines. Under the new death penalty laws, individuals were convicted of murder and sentenced to death in each of the states. The state supreme courts upheld the death sentence, so the defendants appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

7 - 2 decision for Georgia

Stevens

Gregg

Georgia

Brennan

Marshall

Stewart

Blackmun

White

Rehnquist

Burger

Powell

Plurality Opinion by Justice Stewart

Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a plurality including Justices Lewis Powell and John Paul Stevens, held that the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of murder does not automatically violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Stewart began by explaining that when capital punishment is under Eighth Amendment, the Court must make a determination based on the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Stewart argued that the most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the death penalty was the legislative response to the Court’s ruling in Furman v. Georgia, noting that 35 states enacted new statutes providing for capital punishment in line with the decision.

Stewart stated that for a penalty to be constitutional, it must accord with the “dignity of man”, meaning it can’t involve the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” and can’t be “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Stewart noted that retribution is an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct and is essential in an ordered society to prevent vigilante justice. He further explained that while the deterrent value of the death penalty is up for debate, the Court should defer to legislative judgments on the issue.

Regarding the specific procedures in Georgia, Stewart found that the new statutory scheme sufficiently addressed the concerns of arbitrary and wanton application raised in Furman. The new Georgia procedures employed a bifurcated trial in which the jury first determines guilt and then, in a separate hearing, considers aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Stewart argued that by requiring the jury to find at least one of ten statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, the law narrowed the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. Stewart also stated that the appellate review process by the Georgia Supreme Court provided an additional safeguard against the capricious imposition of the penalty. He found that the Georgia sentencing procedures focused the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the characteristics of the individual defendant. Ultimately, the Court affirmed the death sentence, finding that the statutory system did not violate the Constitution, not did the death penalty itself.

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