Writing for the Court, Justice William Douglas first established “two complementary principles to be reconciled in this case.” First, the right of the individual to freely associate with the people they choose. Second, the constitutional ban against state-sponsored racial inequality enshrined in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The latter, Douglas explained, “of course” prohibits a city from acting as a trustee under a private will promoting racial segregation.

Douglas explained that distinguishing “private” versus “state” actions can be difficult but is done “by sifting facts and weighing circumstances.” Douglas added that “[t]he range of government activities is broad and varied, and the fact that government has engaged in a particular activity does not necessarily mean that an individual entrepreneur or manager of the same kind of undertaking suffers the same constitutional inhibitions.”

Douglas then applied these principles to the context of a will. Douglas stated that if an individual wished to leave a school or center to be used by only one race, but didn’t implicate the State in its supervision, control, or management, the Court would “assume arguendo that no constitutional difficulty would be encountered.” However, Douglas found that Baconsfield Park was “in a different posture,” as it was regularly maintained by the city for years. He asserted that “[i]f the municipality remains entwined in the management or control of the park, it remains subject to the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Douglas dismissed the substitution of trustees as instantly transferring the park from the public to the private sector, given that “the tradition of municipal control had become firmly established.”

Douglas added that the “nature of the service rendered the community by a park,” even if privately owned, “is municipal in nature.” Unlike private social clubs, a park is more like a fire department or police department that traditionally serves the community. Relying on precedent, Douglas found that “[l]ike the streets of the company town in Marsh v. State of Alabama (1946), and the elective process of Terry v. Adams (1953), the predominant character and purpose of this park are municipal.” Douglas explained that “[m]ass recreation through the use of parks is plainly in the public domain; and state courts that aid private parties to perform that public function on a segregated basis implicate the State in conduct proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Ultimately, Douglas concluded, writing “the public character of this park requires that it be treated as a public institution subject to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who now has title under state law.”