Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
Key Principle
“There is no federal general common law.”
Rule: Federal courts must apply the law of the state in diversity jurisdiction cases, except when dealing with issues governed by the Constitution or acts of Congress.
Case Overview
CITATION
ARGUED ON
DECIDED ON
DECIDED BY
304 U.S. 64
Jan. 31, 1938
Apr. 25, 1938
Legal Issue
Are federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction required to apply state common law, or can they apply general federal common law?
Holding
There is no general federal common law, and federal courts must apply state common law when hearing cases under diversity jurisdiction.
The scene of the 1934 accident that gave rise to the case | Credit: Staff of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed
Background
In 1934, Harry Tompkins was injured while walking along a commonly used footpath that ran alongside a railroad track owned and operated by on the Erie Railroad Company. Tompkins was struck by what he claimed was a door sticking out from a passing freight train and alleged negligence against the railroad. Tompkins was a citizen of Pennsylvania, and Erie was a corporation domiciled in New York.
Erie argued that under Pennsylvania law, their only duty to Tompkins as a trespasser was to refrain from willful or wanton injury. Tompkins argued that Pennsylvania courts hadn’t yet ruled definitively on the issue, so Erie’s duty should be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York relied on the doctrine established in Swift v. Tyson (1842) and held that general federal common law should govern the claims. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision, and Erie appealed to SCOTUS.
Summary
6 - 2 decision for Erie Railroad Co.
Erie Railroad Co.
Tompkins
Brandeis
* Justice Cardozo took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Reed
Hughes
McReynolds
Butler
Stone
Cardozo*
Roberts
Black
Opinion of the Court
Writing for the Court, Justice Louis Brandeis held that “there is no federal general common law” in diversity jurisdiction cases. He stated that federal courts do not have the power to exercise independent judgment on matters of general law, so they must apply state law, including the unwritten common law as declared by the state’s highest court.
The decision overruled Swift v. Tyson (1842), which had held that federal courts could independently determine rules on matters of general law without being bound by state court decisions. §34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Rules of Decision Act) requires federal courts to apply both state statutory and common law except where the Constitution, treaties, or Acts of Congress otherwise require. The Court concluded that Swift v. Tyson had misinterpreted §34 and deemed it unconstitutional because “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts,” and “no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.” Justice Brandeis pointed out that the Swift doctrine had created discrimination against state citizens by non-citizens who could forum-shop for favorable federal general law, made it so rights varied based on whether enforcement was sought in state or federal court, and it prevented uniformity in the administration of state law while failing to achieve nationwide uniformity. He wrote that as a result, federal courts had “invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States.”
In Tompkin’s case, Justice Brandeis found that the District Court should’ve applied Pennsylvania common law as declared by their highest court rather than federal “general” law. He emphasized the principle that issues of Pennsylvania state law should be determined by the state legislature and state courts, stating that it “is not a matter of federal concern". Justice Brandeis wrote that the authority and only authority is the state, and federal courts hearing cases under diversity jurisdiction must respect that authority.